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TEN ANGRY MEN: UNANIMOUS JURY
VERDICTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS AND
INCORPORATION AFTER MCDONALD
Kate Riordan*
I. INTRODUCTION
Any American who has watched a legal drama on television or in film
would assume that a criminal conviction can occur only if a jury of twelve
persons votes unanimously.1 But, as with most assumptions about the legal
world, this one is incorrect; it is wholly constitutional for an accused to be
convicted of a crime without twelve guilty votes.2 In criminal trials, the
Constitution requires neither that the jury be comprised of twelve persons3
nor that the vote be unanimous.4
*

Candidate for Juris Doctor and LL.M. in International Human Rights, Northwestern
University School of Law, May 2013; M.A., Queen’s University Belfast, 2008; B.S.F.S.,
Georgetown University, 2007. Thank you to Al Alschuler, Shari Diamond, and Will Singer
for your valuable contributions and considerable assistance. I would also like to thank my
family and friends, particularly Evan Elsner, Ashley Burns, Emma Jones, and Katie Pulaski
for always providing much-needed distractions.
1
See, e.g., TWELVE ANGRY MEN (Metro Goldwyn Mayer 1957) (“However you decide,
your verdict must be unanimous.”).
2
Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
3
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
4
Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 404. Apodaca’s sister case, Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356
(1972), was decided at the same time. Petitioners challenged Louisiana’s majority-verdict
law, which allowed for a conviction on a nine-to-three vote. (Louisiana has since changed
that law to allow for a ten-to-two conviction. LA. CODE. CRIM. PROC. ANN. art 782 (2005).)
Moreover, the case in Johnson was tried before the announcement of Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968), which incorporated the Sixth Amendment’s right to trial to the
states, and therefore, “unlike Apodaca v. Oregon, decided today, the Sixth Amendment’s
guarantee of a trial by jury is not applicable here.” Johnson, 406 U.S. at 397 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). While this Comment is focused on Apodaca, the Johnson opinion is treated as
an extension of Apodaca, and portions of the Johnson opinion may be used in a discussion of
Apodaca. Although technically they are different opinions—Johnson centered on whether
unanimity is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process of law and
Apodaca centered on whether unanimity is a violation of the Sixth Amendment’s right to
trial—functionally, and for the purposes of this discussion, they are treated as one and the
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Williams v. Florida (upholding the constitutionality of six-person
juries) and Apodaca v. Oregon (upholding the constitutionality of nonunanimous majority verdicts in criminal trials) can be easily reconciled with
one another, as they both concern common-law requirements for criminal
trials upon which the Constitution is silent. But the application of these two
holdings is far more problematic. Williams, which considered the
constitutionality of Florida’s six-person criminal juries, held that neither
federal nor state trials need to utilize a twelve-person jury.5 However,
Apodaca upheld the constitutionality of non-unanimous majority verdicts
only in state criminal trials.6 In federal criminal trials, the Supreme Court
has found that the verdict must be unanimous.7 Apodaca’s holding, the
product of an odd split among the Justices, is the reason why there are at
present two jurisdictions in the United States where a defendant can be
found guilty of a crime by just ten out of twelve votes: the states of Oregon
and Louisiana.8
Apodaca remains good law, and that fact is problematic for three
reasons. The first and timeliest reason is that the Court set forth an
incorporation standard in McDonald v. City of Chicago that directly
undermines the current two-track approach to unanimity in criminal trials.9
Secondly, allowing majority verdicts in criminal trials seriously weakens
the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard.10 And finally, empirical research
has since disproven the assumptions about jury behavior upon which the
plurality in Apodaca relied.11
This is not a purely academic debate. The Apodaca decision not only
affects Louisiana and Oregon; similar legislation has been proposed in other
states that would allow for majority verdicts in criminal trials in attempts to

same (particularly as the lengthy dissents and concurrences are found in Johnson rather than
in Apodaca).
5
Williams, 399 U.S. at 86.
6
Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 410–11.
7
Johnson, 406 U.S. at 369–77 (Powell, J., concurring).
8
OR. REV. STAT. § 136.450 (2009); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 782 (2010). In
1972, Louisiana required only nine votes, but in 1974 the Louisiana legislature amended the
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure such that ten votes are now necessary for a
conviction. 1975 La. Acts 1st Ex. Sess. 81, 82.
9
130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (holding that the Second Amendment was fully
incorporated and thus it is unconstitutional for a state or local government to deprive citizens
of the right to bear arms).
10
See infra Part III.B.
11
See infra Part III.C.
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be “tough on crime.”12 State representatives from both California and
Colorado have introduced bills in their respective legislatures that would
allow for majority verdicts in criminal cases.13 More recently, in 2003, the
New York State Assembly considered a majority-verdict proposal couched
as an anti-crime initiative aiming to “produce more convictions and put
more criminals behind bars.”14 The bill’s sponsors claimed that the
unanimity requirement resulted in a “higher crime rate” and “disrespect for
the law.”15 As of yet, these proposals have failed and no state (besides
Oregon and Louisiana) has adopted a majority-verdict provision for
criminal trials.16 But in some states majority-verdict proposals are
introduced fairly frequently, as there is obvious and powerful political
capital to be gained from increasing conviction rates, regardless of the
means by which one does so.17
Defendants in Oregon and Louisiana continue to object to their state’s
practices. Scott Bowen was accused in Oregon of multiple felony sex
offenses, including first-degree rape, alleged to have occurred between
1991 and 2000.18 During his trial, he requested a jury instruction that the
verdict shall be unanimous.19 His request was denied and he was convicted
by a vote of ten to two; “[i]n forty-eight states, the jurors would have been
required to continue deliberating toward consensus . . . . But because this
case arose in Oregon, petitioner stands convicted.”20 The Supreme Court

12
One scholar notes that, at the federal level, the two major parties “have participated in
a kind of bidding war to see who can appropriate the label ‘tough on crime’” through their
frequent enactment of tougher sentences and more criminal prohibitions. William J. Stuntz,
The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 509 (2001). While
Stuntz focuses his discussion on federal criminal law, his observation that “appealing to the
median voter is more likely to mean some combination of two things: generating outcomes
(not rules) the median voter wants, and taking symbolic stands the median voter finds
attractive” is equally applicable to political pressures at the state level. Id. at 530.
13
Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes in Jury Deliberations, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1261,
1266 (2000).
14
Matthew Tulchin, Note, An Analysis of the Development of the Jury’s Role in a New
York Criminal Trial, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 425, 425–26 (2005) (citing Assemb. 4469, 226th Leg.
Sess. (N.Y. 2003)).
15
Id. at 483.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 482 n.310.
18
State v. Bowen, 185 P.3d 1129, 1130 (Or. Ct. App. 2008).
19
State v. Bowen, 168 P.3d 1208, 1208 (Or. Ct. App. 2007).
20
Reply Brief for Petitioner on Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Bowen v. Oregon, 130
S. Ct. 52 (2009) (No. 08-1117).
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denied cert in 2009.21
More recently, Alonso Herrera was convicted on a ten-to-two vote of
unauthorized use of a vehicle.22 Again, the defendant requested a jury
instruction asking that the verdict be unanimous.23 This request was denied,
the Oregon Supreme Court denied review, and a writ of certiorari was
submitted to the Supreme Court.24 On January 10, 2011, the Court denied
cert.25 Far from being merely an interesting footnote about criminal
procedure, the Apodaca decision has had grave repercussions for accused
defendants in Oregon and Louisiana.
This Comment argues that the constitutionality of majority verdicts in
state criminal trials needs to be reexamined, and overturned, in light of
recent Supreme Court decisions and empirical studies. Part II will include
(a) a brief history of the incorporation doctrine in general and the
incorporation of the Sixth Amendment in particular, and (b) an in-depth
examination of the reasoning of the Apodaca holding. Part III will argue
that the reasoning in Apodaca, disjointed in 1972, has lost all force in the
thirty years since it was decided for three reasons. Firstly, unanimity in
criminal trials satisfies the standard for incorporation the Court set forth in
McDonald in July 2010. Secondly, majority verdicts in criminal trials
implicate serious due process concerns given their weakened adherence to
the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard.
And finally, the Apodaca
plurality’s assumptions about jury behavior, which formed the bulk of its
analysis, have since been proved false in empirical studies. Those studies
have shown that majority-verdict juries deliberate less robustly and tend to
discount the opinions of women and minorities; furthermore, concerns
about the prevalence of hung juries are overblown. In short, the pillars
upon which the Apodaca holding rested have crumbled since it was
decided.
II. INCORPORATION OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS
Originally, the Bill of Rights only applied to the federal government,
21

Bowen v. Oregon, 130 S. Ct. 52 (2009).
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, State v. Herrera, 131 S. Ct. 904 (Jan. 10, 2011)
(No. 10-344).
23
Id.
24
Id. at 1.
25
Eugene Volokh, Supreme Court Declines to Reconsider Constitutionality of
Convictions by Non-Unanimous Juries, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 10, 2011, 11:38
AM), http://volokh.com/2011/01/10/supreme-court-declines-to-reconsider-constitutionalityof-convictions-by-non-unanimous-juries/.
22
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and not the states.26 However, starting with the Slaughter-House Cases in
1873, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment at least
partially extended the Bill of Rights to the states as well.27 In the first half
of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court applied a doctrine known as
“selective incorporation” to determine which provisions of the Bill of
Rights were necessarily binding upon the states through the Due Process
Clause.28
To decide the reach of incorporation in Palko v. Connecticut, the Court
used a standard of whether or not a particular right was “implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty.”29 In that case the Court determined that the
Fifth Amendment’s protection against double jeopardy did not qualify as
such.30 Even though this holding was later overturned in Benton v.
Maryland twenty-two years later,31 the Palko standard remains one of the
most famous formulations of the incorporation doctrine.32 According to
Gideon v. Wainwright, “a provision which is ‘fundamental and essential to
a fair trial’ is made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment.”33 The past fifty years have widened the scope of those
provisions that necessitate incorporation, particularly in regards to personal
(as opposed to economic) liberties.34 In fact, as of 2011, the only rights not
fully incorporated—besides the Sixth Amendment right to a unanimous jury
verdict—are the Third Amendment’s protection against the quartering of
soldiers, the Fifth Amendment’s requirement of a grand jury indictment, the
Seventh Amendment’s right to a jury in civil cases, and the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition against excessive fines.35
Most recently, the Court reaffirmed its adherence to an incorporation
standard of “whether a particular Bill of Rights guarantee is fundamental to
our scheme of ordered liberty and system of justice” in McDonald v. City of
26

See, e.g., Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 250–51 (1833) (holding that the
Fifth Amendment applies only to the federal government).
27
The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
28
For a discussion of the incorporation doctrine, see 2 LEE EPSTEIN & THOMAS G.
WALKER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR A CHANGING AMERICA, 67–87 (2005).
29
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
30
Id. at 329.
31
395 U.S. 784 (1969).
32
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3032 (2010).
33
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (quoting Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S.
455, 465 (1942)). Gideon expressly overturned Betts and incorporated the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel for criminal defendants.
34
See EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 28.
35
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3035 n.13.
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Chicago.36
McDonald, which extended the Second Amendment’s
prohibition on infringing the “right of the people to keep and bear arms” 37
to the states, reiterated that the Court has “abandoned ‘the notion that the
Fourteenth Amendment applies to the States only a watered-down,
subjective version of the individual guarantees of the Bill of Rights,’” and
that it is “‘incongruous’ to apply different standards ‘depending on whether
the claim was asserted in a state or federal court.’”38 Despite the fact that
the incorporation doctrine has widened so that nearly every right guaranteed
by the Bill of Rights applies equally to state and federal governments, the
constitutional right to a unanimous verdict in a criminal trial applies
exclusively to the federal courts.
A. INCORPORATION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT

The Sixth Amendment has not been fully incorporated; however, most
of its provisions have been incorporated piecemeal.39 The Amendment
reads as follows:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
40
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

In addition to the rights mentioned in the text, the Sixth Amendment
also guarantees other fundamental aspects of criminal trials, including the
reasonable-doubt requirement and a jury of at least six members.41 Because
these rights are “fundamental and essential to a fair trial” they are binding
upon the states, even though the Sixth and Seventh Amendments do not
36

Id. at 3034 (emphasis omitted).
U.S. CONST. amend. II.
38
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3035 (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1964)).
39
See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (incorporating the right to a jury trial in
criminal cases); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965) (incorporating the
defendant’s right to confront witnesses against him); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,
339 (1962) (incorporating the right to counsel in non-capital criminal trials); Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (incorporating the right to counsel in capital trials).
40
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
41
See In re Winship, 391 U.S. 385, 364, 367 (1970) (holding that all elements of a crime
must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, regardless of whether the defendant is tried as an
adult or a juvenile); Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 749 (1948) (holding that in a
federal trial for murder in the first degree, “the jury’s decision both upon guilt and whether
the punishment of death should be imposed must be unanimous.”).
37
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explicitly provide for them.42
In Williams v. Florida, the Court held that Florida’s six-member jury
statute satisfied the Sixth Amendment as carried to the states by Duncan v.
Louisiana, which incorporated the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.43
The Court found twelve-member juries were not “an indispensable
component” of the goals and purposes of a jury trial.44 For the purposes
here, there are two notable aspects to the decision.
The first is that the Williams Court, in holding that a six-person jury
would suffice for a state trial, found that the necessary consequence of the
decision is that twelve-member juries are not constitutionally mandated in
federal criminal trials either. “Our holding does no more than leave these
considerations to Congress and the States, unrestrained by an interpretation
of the Sixth Amendment that would forever dictate the precise number that
can constitute a jury.”45 The Court assumed that the constitutional
requirements of a fair trial applied equally to federal and state courts.46
The second is that the Court noted that a six-person jury can fulfill the
constitutionally mandated duties and purposes of a jury just as well as a
twelve-person jury, “particularly if the requirement for unanimity was
retained.”47 The Court declined to address “whether or not the requirement
of unanimity is an indispensable element of the Sixth Amendment jury
trial.” However, it did state that while much of its historical analysis
applied equally to the unanimity requirement and the twelve-man jury, “the
former, unlike the latter, may well serve an important role in the jury
function, for example, as a device for insuring that the Government bear the
heavier burden of proof.”48
And yet, just two years later, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment
did not impose a unanimity requirement on the states, while at the same
time finding that unanimity was required in federal court.49 Apodaca v.
Oregon and its sister case, Johnson v. Louisiana, upheld state procedures
that allowed criminal verdicts on non-unanimous majority votes. Oregon
allows criminal defendants to be convicted on a ten-to-two vote, unless the
42

Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 465 (1942).
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86 (1970); see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 149 (1968).
44
Williams, 399 U.S. at 100.
45
Id. at 103.
46
Id.
47
Id. at 100.
48
Id. at 100 n.46.
49
Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 366, 375 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
43
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charge is for murder, in which case eleven votes are required.50 Louisiana
allowed for even fewer votes; only nine guilty votes out of twelve were
required for a conviction.51 Apodaca found that unanimity was not essential
to the function of the jury and therefore did not merit incorporation to the
states; unanimity was, however, constitutionally mandated in federal
criminal cases.52 Apodaca, then, not only rejected the dictum (from just two
years prior) that the unanimity requirement “may well serve an important
role in the jury function,” but it also rejected Duncan’s notion that the rights
of defendants in criminal trials should not depend on whether the case was
tried in state or federal court.53
What is interesting about the Apodaca holding—and indeed it is this
feature that generates doubt about its value—is that a plurality of the Court
did not subscribe to any of its reasoning. Four justices agreed that
unanimity in verdicts is not necessary for a fair trial in either federal or state
courts and thus concluded there was no constitutionally mandated
unanimity requirement regardless of jurisdiction.54 In reaching this
conclusion, Justice White, in an opinion joined by Justice Blackmun,
Justice Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger, stated that majority verdicts do
not compromise the function of the jury and that the reasonable-doubt
standard applies to each individual juror rather than to the jury as a group.55
Another four—Justices Stewart, Brennan, Marshall, and Douglas—took the
opposite view, that unanimity was constitutionally required in both federal
and state courts.56 Justice Powell broke the tie and found that unanimity
50

OR. REV. STAT. § 136.450 (2009).
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 782 (2010). In 1972, the state did indeed only require
nine votes, but now ten votes are necessary for a conviction. 1975 La. Acts 1st Ex. Sess. 81,
82.
52
Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410 (1972).
53
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases which—were they to be tried in a federal
court—would come within the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee.”).
54
Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 411.
55
Id. at 411–12. Justice Blackmun filed a concurring opinion, adding only that he did
not think the majority-verdict policy was a “wise one” but that did not mean it was
“constitutionally offensive.” Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 365 (1972) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring). He also noted that a majority-verdict system that allowed for a seven-to-five
conviction would “afford [him] great difficulty.” Id. at 366.
56
Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 414 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Johnson, 406 U.S. at 380 (Douglas,
J., dissenting); id. at 395 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 399 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In
keeping with the disjointed spirit of the opinion, the dissenters filed four different opinions.
But they all agreed that unanimity was a constitutional requirement, binding on the federal
and state governments.
51
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was required for federal courts, but it should not be incorporated to the
states.57 Therefore, Justice Powell’s opinion is the sole reason why
unanimity remains unincorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment,
despite the Court’s frequent dicta placing unanimity among the elements of
a fair trial. In fact, the most telling component of Apodaca is that eight out
of nine Justices believed that unanimity requirements should apply equally
to the state and federal courts.58
B. APODACA V. OREGON

Robert Apodaca, Henry Morgan Cooper, Jr., and James Arnold
Madden were “convicted of assault with a deadly weapon, burglary in a
dwelling, and grand larceny” during different trials in Oregon state courts.59
All of the juries returned non-unanimous verdicts.60 Apodaca and Madden
were convicted by a vote of eleven to one; Cooper was convicted by a vote
of ten to two (the minimum vote for a conviction).61 The Oregon Court of
Appeals affirmed their convictions, the Supreme Court of Oregon denied
review, and all three defendants petitioned the Supreme Court of the United
States on the basis that majority verdicts in criminal trials violate the Sixth
Amendment, which applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment.62 In Johnson v. Louisiana, decided on the same day as
Apodaca, Mr. Johnson was arrested in his home in Louisiana without an
arrest warrant after the victim of an armed robbery identified Johnson as the
perpetrator from photographs.63 Johnson was found guilty by a nine-tothree vote, and the Louisiana courts rejected his challenges, whereupon the
Court granted cert.64
57

Johnson, 406 U.S. at 395–96 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. (“In any event, the affirmance must not obscure that the majority of the Court
remains of the view that, as in the case of every specific of the Bill of Rights that extends to
the States, the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial guarantee, however it is to be construed, has
identical application against both State and Federal Governments.”).
59
Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 405–06.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 406.
62
Id.; see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149–50 (1968) (incorporating the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial).
63
Johnson, 406 U.S. at 358. There is a functional difference between the validity of the
claims in Apodaca and Johnson: due to the timing of Duncan v. Louisiana, the Sixth
Amendment was not applicable to Johnson’s case, and therefore Johnson did not have a right
to a jury at all. However, again, in terms of analysis of the relevant issues at hand, the
opinions can be treated as one and the same.
64
Id.
58
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In deciding these two companion cases, Justice White, joined by
Justice Blackmun, Justice Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger, followed
the Court’s reasoning in Williams and held that the Sixth Amendment did
not require unanimity in state or federal criminal trials.65 The plurality
found, as in Williams, that there was an “inability to divine ‘the intent of the
Framers’ when they eliminated references to the ‘accustomed requisites’” in
the language of the Sixth Amendment.66 Due to this impossibility, the
Justices needed to “turn to other than purely historical considerations” in
“determining what is meant by a jury.”67 The opinion thus focused upon
the jury trial’s “interposition between the accused and his accuser of the
commonsense judgment of a group of laymen,” 68 and the jury’s role as a
“safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the
compliant, biased or eccentric judge.”69 In these cases, the Court asked
whether majority verdicts lessen the reliability of the jury’s verdict or
diminish the quality of jury deliberations—questions that the plurality
answered in the negative.70 But current jury research contradicts the
intuition of the plurality.71
The plurality ultimately concluded that there was “no difference
between juries required to act unanimously and those permitted to convict
or acquit by votes of 10 to two or 11 to one.”72 The Court also noted with
approval that majority verdicts would reduce the number of hung juries,
which are costly to the judicial system in terms of perceived wasted
resources and the subsequent costs of relitigating.73
The plurality likewise rejected the petitioners’ argument that majority
verdicts threaten the reasonable-doubt standard, stating that the burden of
proof constitutionally mandated in criminal trials is not found in the Sixth
Amendment.74 Furthermore, Justice White wrote that there was “no basis”
for thinking that “when minority jurors express sincere doubts” they would
be ignored by the fellow jurors, “even if deliberation has not been
65

Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 406.
Id. at 410. For a discussion of the legislative history of the Sixth Amendment, see
infra Part III.A.
67
Id.
68
Id. (quoting Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970)).
69
Id. (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968)).
70
Taylor-Thompson, supra note 13, at 1310.
71
Id.; see also infra Part III.C.
72
Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 411.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 411–12; see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363–64 (1970).
66
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exhausted and minority jurors have grounds for acquittal which, if pursued,
might persuade members of the majority to acquit.”75 Justice White
asserted: “That rational men disagree is not in itself equivalent to a failure
of proof by the State, nor does it indicate infidelity to the reasonable-doubt
standard.”76 Notably, the plurality rejected the contention that “majority
jurors, aware of their responsibility and power over the liberty of the
defendant, would simply refuse to listen to arguments presented to them in
favor of acquittal, terminate discussion, and render a verdict.”77
The petitioners also claimed that majority verdicts interfere with the
“effective application” of the requirement that jury panels reflect a cross
section of the community.78 In response, the plurality stated that, despite
the prohibition against systematic exclusion of groups from juries,79 it
cannot be said that “every distinct voice in the community has a right to be
represented on every jury and a right to prevent conviction of a defendant in
any case.”80
Furthermore, the Court made some very optimistic
assumptions that the voices of ethnic and racial minorities would be heard
and seriously considered and stated that there was “no proof” that votes
would be cast “for guilt or innocence based on prejudice rather than the
evidence.”81
The dissenting voices, Justices Douglas, Brennan, Marshall, and
Stewart, came to the opposite conclusions.82 They found that the Sixth
Amendment required unanimity in federal criminal trials and that the
Fourteenth Amendment required that this provision be applied to the
states.83 Justice Brennan worried in his dissent, “if we construe the Bill of

75

Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 361 (1972).
Id. at 362.
77
Id. at 361.
78
Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 412–13; see Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 510–12 (1967);
Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 131–32 (1940); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 589 (1935);
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309–10 (1880).
79
See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994) (forbidding gender-based
exclusions from the jury); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (forbidding racebased exclusions).
80
Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 413 (1972).
81
Id. at 413–14.
82
Id. at 414 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Johnson, 406 U.S. at 380 (Douglas, J., dissenting);
id. at 395 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 399 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
83
Johnson, 406 U.S. at 380 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Indeed, in the Johnson dissent
(from the majority’s conclusion that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury did not apply),
Justice Stewart, with whom Justices Brennan and Marshall agreed, argued that if the
Fourteenth Amendment alone requires that a state must “accord the right of trial by jury in a
76
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Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment to permit States to ‘experiment’
with the basic rights of people, we open a veritable Pandora’s box.”84
Thus Justice Powell’s concurring opinion decided that the Sixth
Amendment required unanimous verdicts in federal court, but not in state
court.85 Had Justice Powell joined the White opinion wholly, it is possible
that there would still be literature calling for a reexamination of Apodaca
due to the empirical conclusions about jury behavior that were not available
to the Justices in 1972. But because Justice Powell’s decisive opinion held
that the unanimity requirement applies to federal and not state courts, the
Court needs to reexamine the issue under the incorporation standards
recently affirmed in McDonald.86
Justice Powell concurred in the plurality result that a defendant may be
constitutionally convicted in state court by a majority verdict, but he was
“not in accord with a major premise upon which that judgment is based.”87
Justice Powell disagreed that the jury trial, as applied to the states under the
Fourteenth Amendment, needed to be “identical in every detail” to federal
jury trials under the Sixth Amendment.88 “I do not think that all the
elements of jury trial within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment are
necessarily embodied or incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”89 It is that precise holding that is most directly
contradicted by the Court’s standard of incorporation set out in McDonald.
Acknowledging history and precedent, Justice Powell stated that “[i]n
an unbroken line of cases reaching back into the late 1800’s, the Justices of
this Court have recognized, virtually without dissent, that unanimity is one
of the indispensable features of federal jury trial.”90 However, with respect
to state trials, Justice Powell looked to “cases decided when the intendment
of that Amendment was not as clouded by the passage of time” before
concluding that “due process does not require that the States apply the
federal jury-trial right with all its gloss.”91 Indeed, Justice Powell had
criminal case, then only a unanimous jury can return a constitutionally valid verdict.” Id. at
397 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
84
Id. at 387 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
85
See id. at 373–74 (Powell, J., concurring).
86
Id.; McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3034–36 (2010); see infra Part
III.A.
87
Johnson, 406 U.S. at 369 (Powell, J., concurring).
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 371.
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precedential support in his contention, quoting Justice Peckham:
When providing in their constitution and legislation for the manner in which civil or
criminal actions shall be tried, it is in entire conformity with the character of the
Federal Government that [the States] should have the right to decide for themselves
what shall be the form and character of the procedure in such trials, . . . whether there
shall be a jury of twelve or a lesser number, and whether the verdict must be
92
unanimous or not.

Further, the Court held in 1912 that “in criminal cases due process of law is
not denied by a state law which dispenses with . . . the necessity of a jury of
twelve, or unanimity in the verdict.”93
Justice Powell conceded that these precedents concluded that states
could even do away with jury trials completely—a conclusion which was
“grounded on a more limited view of due process” than the Court accepted
in 1972, and which the Court rejected in Duncan.94 However, Justice
Powell found nothing in Duncan or other precedents which would
“require[] repudiation of the views expressed in Maxwell and Jordan with
respect to . . . the unanimity of [a jury’s] verdict.”95 Indeed, Justice Powell
found that to consider unanimity “so fundamental to the essentials of jury
trial that this particular requirement of the Sixth Amendment is necessarily
binding on the States” would give “unwarranted and unwise scope to the
incorporation doctrine.”96 Justice Powell thought, as did the plurality, that
the function of the jury in a majority verdict was not compromised, and he
endorsed the notion that states should be allowed to “become a ‘laboratory’
and to experiment with a range of trial and procedural alternatives.”97
The history of the incorporation doctrine has been one of expansion.
Of those rights that are not incorporated, the right to a unanimous verdict in
a criminal trial is perhaps the most cherished to modern sensibilities. The
notion that the outcome of a criminal trial hinges on whether it was brought
in state or federal court is contrary to the raison d’etre of the incorporation
doctrine.98 Perhaps in 1972, the incorporation doctrine was not expanded

92

Id. at 371–72 (quoting Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 605 (1900)).
Id. at 372 (quoting Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167, 176 (1912)).
94
Id.
95
Id.; Maxwell, 176 U.S. 581; Jordan, 225 U.S. 167.
96
Johnson, 406 U.S. at 372 (Powell, J., concurring).
97
Id. at 376. A key factor to the “laboratory” argument is that states would ultimately
reject those experiments that were subsequently found to have failed. Arguably, majority
verdicts have been empirically discredited as inferior to unanimous verdicts, see infra Part
III.C, yet Oregon and Louisiana remain steadfast.
98
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3035 (2010). The Court reiterated that
93
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so far as to include the Sixth Amendment guarantees, but in 2010, after the
incorporation of the Second Amendment in McDonald,99 the answer as to
whether unanimity is fundamental enough to the American criminal system
as to warrant incorporation is unequivocally “yes.”
III. WHY APODACA SHOULD BE REVERSED
The venerable principle of stare decisis counsels that Supreme Court
holdings should not be overturned but for very compelling reasons. But the
principle is weakest when considering the continued propriety of
constitutional rules of procedure, such as the holding of Apodaca.100 The
Court has proved willing to overturn cases in the past when there have been
serious errors in analysis, or, as in this case, if the available social science
data requires a reexamination of previously held beliefs.101 Apodaca is one
such case that is ripe for reexamination.
Firstly, Part III.A argues that the McDonald stance against the twotiered incorporation scheme compels the Court to reassess those provisions
of the Bill of Rights that remain unincorporated.102 Under this analysis, the
unanimity requirement satisfies the McDonald test for incorporation: it is a
historically ingrained principle of Anglo-American jurisprudence and is
supported by dicta and binding precedent. Furthermore, Part III.B argues
that a non-unanimous jury casts doubt upon the notion of ‘beyond a
reasonable doubt,’ depriving defendants in Oregon and Louisiana of due
process. Finally, Part III.C argues that there are compelling policy
arguments for requiring jury unanimity. The Apodaca Court based much of
its determination that unanimity is not a fundamental right on its
assumption that a majority-verdict jury would function much the same as a
unanimous one.103 However, social science has found the opposite in
different standards should not apply “depending on whether the claim was asserted in a state
or federal court.” Id.; see also infra Part III.C.
99
Id. at 3020.
100
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (“Stare decisis is not an inexorable
command . . . . This is particularly true in constitutional cases, because in such cases
‘correction through legislative action is practically impossible.’ Considerations in favor of
stare decisis are at their acme in cases . . . where reliance interests are involved; the opposite
is true in cases such as the present one involving procedural and evidentiary rules.” (citations
omitted) (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407 (1931) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting))).
101
See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that segregation
in public schools violated the Equal Protection Clause).
102
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3020.
103
Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410–11 (1972).
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studies since the Apodaca holding.104 Therefore, the bedrock of the
Apodaca holding has been seriously undermined by the past forty years of
empirical data.
A. APODACA IS CONTRARY TO THE INCORPORATION STANDARD OF
MCDONALD

The hard stance taken on incorporation in McDonald is certainly the
timeliest reason to reconsider Apodaca. Simply, the McDonald decision
fully rejected the two-track notion of constitutional interpretation.105 In
ruling that the Second Amendment was fully incorporated to the states, the
Court finally and completely “abandoned ‘the notion that the Fourteenth
Amendment applies to the States only [in] a watered-down, subjective
version of the individual guarantees of the Bill of Rights.’”106 The Court
rightly held that different standards should not apply “depending on
whether the claim was asserted in a state or federal court.”107
The Court found that the doctrine of incorporation was so settled by
precedent that, unless it “turn[ed] back the clock or adopt[ed] a special
incorporation test applicable only to the Second Amendment,” the right of
an individual to own a firearm had to be upheld, regardless of
jurisdiction.108 Under the incorporation doctrine as set out through
precedent, “if a Bill of Rights guarantee is fundamental” to American
jurisprudence, that right is “fully binding on the States.”109 As will be
shown, unanimous verdicts in criminal trial are indeed ‘fundamental’ to
American jurisprudence based on historical considerations and prior
decisions by the Court.
The analysis is straightforward. The Court recently reaffirmed that
“incorporated Bill of Rights protections ‘are all to be enforced against the
States under the Fourteenth Amendment according to the same standards
that protect those personal rights against federal encroachment.’”110 And
the Court has not wavered in its contention that the Sixth Amendment
requires unanimous juries in federal criminal trials.111 Yet, as discussed
104

See infra Part III.C.
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3035.
106
Id. (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1964)).
107
Id.
108
Id. at 3046.
109
Id.
110
Id. at 3058.
111
See Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 748–49 (1948); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190
U.S. 197, 211–12 (1903); see also Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 211 (1965), overruled
105
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above, Justice Powell’s concurring opinion, written at a time when
incorporation was a more limited doctrine, means that the Jury Trial Clause
is subject to the “two-track,” “watered-down,” partial incorporation that the
Court expressly rejected in McDonald.112
Indeed, the McDonald opinion already opens the door for overturning
Apodaca. In a lengthy footnote, the Court discusses the oddness of the
Apodaca holding, stating that the ruling “was the result of an unusual
division among the Justices, not an endorsement of the two-track approach
to incorporation.”113 It even goes so far to say that Apodaca does not
“undermine the well-established rule that incorporated Bill of Rights
protections apply identically to the States and the Federal Government.”114
Furthermore, the Court quotes Justice Brennan’s dissent, which reiterates
that eight out of nine Justices believed that the Sixth Amendment’s
guarantees have “identical application against both State and Federal
Governments.”115
Beyond addressing Apodaca explicitly, McDonald, in its history of
incorporation, addresses the special need for incorporation of those rights
that concern criminal process.116 Referring to those cases that incorporated
jury trials, the right to counsel, the reasonable-doubt standard, the
Confrontation Clause and others, the Court stated that this line of cases
proves that the Court has concluded that “to ensure a criminal trial satisfies
essential standards of fairness,” some trial procedures need to be identical in
state and federal courts.117 “The need for certainty and uniformity is more
pressing, and the margin for error slimmer, when criminal justice is at
issue.”118 Of course, it is impossible to predict how the Court would
approach one topic based upon dicta on another one. But the Court must
have found the issue of incorporation of criminal procedure guarantees
fairly important in order to devote time in an opinion about gun rights.

on other grounds by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (supporting the proposition in
dictum).
112
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3035 n.14.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id. at 3094 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
117
Id.
118
Id.
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1. Unanimous Verdicts Are Historically Ingrained in Anglo-American
Jurisprudence
Unanimous verdicts—both in civil and criminal trials—have been a
feature of the Anglo-American legal system for centuries. Although a
unanimous verdict was not always required at the very beginning of the
jury, by 1367, during the rule of Edward III, a unanimity requirement rule
was established.119 By the time of Edward IV’s reign (1461–1483), the
unanimity requirement was the norm, absent the consent of both parties.120
Even in fourteenth century Parliaments (where the numbers were such that
a unanimity requirement was vastly more impractical than for a jury), there
is evidence that a majority vote was deemed insufficient to bind the
community or its individual members to a legal decision.121 Blackstone
stated in his Commentaries that “[i]t is the most transcendent privilege
which any subject can enjoy, or wish for, that he cannot be affected either in
his property, his liberty, or his person, but by the unanimous consent of
twelve of his neighbors and equals.”122
At the founding of the United States, James Madison proposed that the
Bill of Rights should protect those provisions of the common-law jury that
were deemed most vital.123 His proposed Sixth Amendment guaranteed the
right to trial, “by an impartial jury of freeholders of the vicinage, with the
requisite of unanimity for conviction, of the right of challenge, and other
accustomed requisites.”124 However, there was some disagreement as to the
vicinage requirement and thus the Sixth Amendment was adopted in its
present language, omitting any reference to unanimity.125
There are two plausible reasons as to why the unanimity requirement
was dropped from the language of the Amendment: either it was intended to
have a substantive effect, or the concept of unanimity was so implicit that
the Founders thought it did not require mention. The Williams and
Apodaca opinions held the former, at least as it concerned unanimity and a

119

Douglas Smith, The Historical and Constitutional Contexts of Jury Reform, 25
HOFSTRA L. REV. 377, 397 (1996).
120
Id.
121
M. V. CLARKE, MEDIEVAL REPRESENTATION AND CONSENT 251 (2d ed. 1964).
122
3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *379 (emphasis added).
123
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 435 (1789).
124
Id.
125
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The particulars of the vicinage requirement differed
regionally, and the Founders eventually omitted the requirement rather than find a solution
that suited everyone. See 5 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 424 n.1 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1904).
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twelve-person jury.126 However, given other extrinsic evidence, the latter
seems more probable.
In a 1789 letter, James Madison wrote of his frustration in finalizing
the wording of the Sixth Amendment so that the first Congress would agree
to it: “They are equally inflexible in opposing a definition of the locality of
Juries. The vicinage they contend is either too vague or too strict a
term.”127 Madison further could not achieve consensus on his proposal of
the insertion of “accustomed requisites” after the word ‘Juries,’ because
“[t]he truth is that in most of the States the practice is different, and hence
the irreconcilable difference of ideas on the subject.”128 However, the
“irreconcilable difference” was the question of from where the jurors should
be drawn, not the question of unanimity. Non-unanimous verdicts were not
historically common among the states.129
Likewise, in discussing the wording of the ninth section of the Bill of
Rights of the Pennsylvania Constitution in 1788, which includes an express
provision that verdicts shall be unanimous, Chief Justice M’Kean found the
stipulation to be unnecessary.130 “I have always understood it to be the law,
independent of this section,” he stated, “that the twelve jurors must be
unanimous in their verdict, and yet this section makes this express
provision.”131
Further, in 1833, Justice Story noted in his Commentaries that the jury
trial was “now incorporated into all our State constitutions as a fundamental
right, and the Constitution of the United States would have been justly
obnoxious to the most conclusive objection if it had not recognized and
confirmed it in the most solemn terms.”132 In a footnote, he defined that
jury right quickly and simply: “[a] trial by jury is generally understood to
mean . . . a trial by jury of twelve men . . . who must unanimously concur in
126

Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410 (1972); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 97
(1970).
127
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 125 (emphasis omitted). The House of
Representatives passed the Amendment “in substantially this form but after more than a
week of debate in the Senate it returned to the House considerably altered.” Williams, 399
U.S. at 94 (citing S. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 77 (1789)).
128
Id.
129
Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under State Constitutions
When the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in 1868: What Rights Are Deeply Rooted in
American History and Tradition?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 7, 77 (2008).
130
Smith, supra note 119, at 428 n.206.
131
Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Respublica v. Oswald, 1 Dall. 319, 323 (Pa. 1788)).
132
2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 559
(Melville M. Bigelow ed., William S. Hein & Co., Inc., ed., 1994) (1891).
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the guilt of the accused . . . . Any law, therefore, dispensing with any of
these requisites, may be considered unconstitutional.”133 More recent Court
decisions support the notion that the common-law definition of jury trial is
constitutionally protected: in Giles v. California, the Court stated that the
Sixth Amendment codifies “specific” rights “that were the trial rights of
Englishmen.”134
2. Unanimous Verdicts Are Supported by Precedent and Other Persuasive
Authority
Furthermore, dicta of the Court imply that unanimity was taken for
granted as an essential feature of the American trial. In Thompson v. Utah,
the Court held that because Utah was still a territory, and thus a federal
entity, unanimity was required in criminal trials.135 Justice Harlan aptly
asserted that he for one thought that the Constitution required unanimity
because “the wise men who framed the Constitution of the United States
and the people who approved it were of opinion that life and liberty, when
involved in criminal prosecutions, would not be adequately secured except
through the unanimous verdict of twelve jurors.”136 To come to this
conclusion, the Court went back to Hale’s Pleas of the Crown, which stated
“[t]he law of England hath afforded the best method of trial, that is possible
. . . namely, by a jury of twelve men all concurring.”137 Justice Harlan
found that the words “jury” and “trial by jury” were used in the Constitution
“with reference to the meaning affixed to them” in common law at the time
of its adoption.138 While this holding applied only to the federal
government, it is telling that in 1898 the Justices found it axiomatic that the
Constitution mandated that verdicts should be unanimous in criminal trials.
Indeed, just one year prior to Thompson, the Court held that unanimity
was required in civil trials; again, the Territory of Utah accepted majority
verdicts, which the Court held was unconstitutional.139 In so ruling, the
Court kept its analysis short and to the point: “unanimity was one of the
peculiar and essential features of trial by jury at the common law. No

133
134
135
136
137
138
139

Id. at 559 n.2 (emphasis omitted).
Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 375 (2008).
Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 350–51 (1898).
Id. at 353.
Id. at 350 (quoting 1 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 33 (1736)).
Id.
American Publishing Co. v. Fisher, 166 U.S. 464, 468 (1897).
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authorities are needed to sustain this proposition.”140 If no authorities are
needed to say that unanimity was an essential feature of trials in civil cases,
it is even less necessary to elaborate on its importance in a criminal trial.
In the 1953 case of Hibdon v. United States, the Sixth Circuit ruled
that a defendant cannot waive his right to a unanimous verdict, unlike his
right to trial or a jury comprised of less than twelve.141 In support of the
holding, the court stated that even though “the requirement of a unanimous
verdict is nowhere defined in the Constitution,” it is “the inescapable
element of due process that has come down to us from earliest time.” 142
The court also looked to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, finding
its provision that “[t]he verdict shall be unanimous” to be persuasive.143
Furthermore, the court cited the fact that Rule 29(a) of the First Preliminary
Draft of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provided the parties could
stipulate to a majority verdict so long as the court approved.144 However,
this proposal “was so vigorously criticized by bench and bar” because it did
not provide “sufficient protection to a defendant” that it was eliminated
from the final Rule.145 Like other courts, Hibdon found that the
implications of the reasonable-doubt standard were the most compelling
reason to mandate unanimity:
To sustain the validity of a verdict by less than all of the jurors is to destroy this test of
proof for there cannot be a verdict supported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt if
one or more jurors remain reasonably in doubt as to guilt . . . . the right to unanimous
verdict cannot under any circumstances be waived, that it is of the very essence of our
traditional concept of due process in criminal cases, and that the verdict in this case is
146
a nullity because it is not the unanimous verdict of the jury as to guilt.

Of course, the Sixth Circuit’s decision is not binding upon the Supreme
Court. But it is telling that a federal court of appeals found the right to be
so vital to the American trial that it could not even be waived—unlike the
trial itself. Beyond these cases, there lies an almost unbroken line of
decisions that “canonized the virtues of jury unanimity.”147
140

Id. at 468.
204 F.2d 834, 838 (1953).
142
Id. at 838.
143
Id. at 836 (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(a)).
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Id. at 838.
147
Taylor-Thompson, supra note 13, at 206; see also Patton v. United States, 281 U.S.
276, 288 (1930) (noting that the right to a jury trial is best understood as a right to the
common-law jury, which requires a unanimous verdict of twelve); Maxwell v. Dow, 176
141
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Another source that is not binding upon the Court but should be
considered persuasive is the American Bar Association’s view. After the
ABA’s own research of jury trials, in 1976 the ABA’s Commission on
Standards of Judicial Administration published its Standards as related to
Trial Courts.148 Standard 2.10 states that “[t]he verdict of the jury [in
criminal cases] should be unanimous.”149 This standard has not changed in
the past forty years.150 The Court has recently affirmed its confidence in the
conclusions by the ABA, stating in 2005 that the Court “long ha[s] referred
to these ABA Standards as guides to determining what is reasonable.”151
The ABA, in an amicus brief on this topic (in support of Bowen v. Oregon,
decided before McDonald) aptly summed up its position on why Apodaca
should be reexamined:
Because each member of the Apodaca Court agreed on the importance of thorough
jury deliberations, attention to minority viewpoints, and community confidence in jury
verdicts, and because the ABA’s review of research and empirical data, as well as the
consensus of the legal community, has concluded that the opposite occurs through the
non-unanimous decision process, the ABA supports petitioner’s request that Apodaca
152
be revisited.

In short, the right to unanimous juries in criminal trials satisfies the
McDonald standard for incorporation: it is historically ingrained in AngloAmerican jurisprudence, there is persuasive dicta in favor of the right, and
other sources to which the Court has looked to guidance before are
unwavering in their support of it.
B. THE IMPORTANCE OF UNANIMITY IN SATISFYING “BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT”

Majority verdicts in criminal trials undermine the beyond-areasonable-doubt standard. The Court not only mentioned the importance
U.S. 581, 586 (1900) (“[A]s the right of trial by jury in certain suits at common law is
preserved by the Seventh Amendment, such a trial implies that there shall be a unanimous
verdict of twelve jurors in all Federal courts where a jury trial is held.”).
148
Brief of Amicus Curiae American Bar Association in Support of Petitioner at 3,
Bowen v. Oregon, 130 S. Ct. 52 (2009) (No. 08-1117). This exact provision remains in
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DISCOVERY AND TRIAL BY JURY § 15(1.1)(c) (1996).
149
Brief of Amicus Curiae American Bar Association in Support of Petitioner, supra
note 148, at 3.
150
Id.
151
Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387 (2005) (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S.
510, 524 (2003)).
152
Brief of Amicus Curiae American Bar Association in Support of Petitioner, supra
note 148, at 4.
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of unanimity in those cases which concerned themselves with trial
procedure; one of the more dramatic statements as to the importance of
unanimous verdicts was in an opinion on the applicability of search and
seizure laws to phone calls.153 Referring to it as an “indestructible
principle” of American criminal law, the Court stated in Billeci v. United
States that “[g]uilt must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. All
twelve jurors must be convinced beyond that doubt.”154 The opinion
continued, “[t]hese principles are not pious platitudes recited to placate the
shades of venerated legal ancients. They are working rules of law binding
upon the court.”155 The practical implications of these requirements were
clear: “the prosecutor in a criminal case must actually overcome the
presumption of innocence, all reasonable doubts as to guilt, and the
unanimous verdict requirement.”156
Regarding majority verdicts, Justice Marshall stated in Johnson that
when a “prosecutor has tried and failed to persuade those [minority] jurors
of the defendant’s guilt . . . . it does violence to language and to logic to
say that the government has proved the defendant’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.”157
Indeed, In re Winship solidified that the reasonable-doubt standard was
constitutionally required.158 The Apodaca dissenters operated under many
of the same assumptions as the Winship Court.159 The Constitution does not
contain the phrase “beyond a reasonable doubt,” but the Court found that
common-law adherence to the burden was persuasive of the necessity for
constitutional protection.160 “Although virtually unanimous adherence to
the reasonable-doubt standard in common-law jurisdictions may not
conclusively establish it as a requirement of due process, such adherence
does ‘reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law should be
enforced and justice administered.’”161 Furthermore, the Winship Court
relied upon dicta from past decisions: “Expressions in many opinions of this
Court indicate that it has long been assumed that proof of a criminal charge
153

Billeci v. United States, 184 F.2d 394 (1950).
Id. at 403 (emphasis added).
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 401 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
158
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970).
159
See Johnson, 406 U.S. at 400–01 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
160
In re Winship, 387 U.S. at 361–62 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155
(1968)).
161
Id.
154
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beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required.”162
Similarly, there is virtually unanimous adherence to the doctrine of
unanimity in common law; the federal government and forty-eight states
require unanimous verdicts in criminal trials. Also like the reasonabledoubt standard, many instances of the Court’s dicta take the unanimity
requirement for granted. It is difficult to see how within just two years the
Court did not find these same authorities to be persuasive. Indeed, in
Justice Douglas’s dissent from Johnson, he reasoned as much, referencing
Winship:
The Constitution does not mention unanimous juries. Neither does it mention . . . that
guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in all criminal cases. Yet it is almost
inconceivable that anyone would have questioned whether proof beyond a reasonable
doubt was in fact the constitutional standard. And, indeed, when such a case finally
163
arose we had little difficulty disposing of the issue.

And again, during the same term as Winship, the Court mentioned in
Williams that, should the issue of unanimity be brought to the Court, it
would be more problematic to dismiss it as a constitutional necessity.164
Unlike the twelve-person jury, unanimity “may well serve an important role
. . . as a device for insuring that the Government bear the heavier burden of
proof.”165 Despite the Court’s foresight, it ultimately came down the other
way.
Of course, it is not that the Apodaca plurality ignored the reasonabledoubt requirement in their analysis. Instead, it was determined that a
majority verdict did not, in and of itself, imply that the Winship reasonabledoubt burden had not been met.166 A crucial question was whether the
burden of proof applied to the mind of each individual juror “or to the
‘group mind’ of the jury as an entity.”167 If the Court adopted the theory
that the reasonable-doubt standard applied to the group mind, “majority
verdicts would clearly be violative of due process since any dissenting juror
would cast a reasonable doubt upon the entire jury.”168
Clearly, the plurality in Apodaca determined that the reasonable-doubt
standard applies to the mind of an individual juror, which is why a majority

162
163
164
165
166
167
168

Id. at 362.
Johnson, 406 U.S. at 381 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 n.46 (1970).
Id.
Johnson, 406 U.S. at 362.
R.L.M., Note, Majority Verdicts in Criminal Trials, 40 TENN. L. REV. 91, 95 (1972).
Id.
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verdict does not cast doubt upon the sufficiency of the evidence. Writing in
the Johnson opinion, Justice White explained that the reasonable-doubt
standard was not threatened by majority verdicts, because “the mere fact”
that there were three holdout jurors “does not in itself demonstrate that, had
the nine jurors of the majority attended further to reason and the evidence,
all or one of them would have developed a reasonable doubt.”169 Justice
White did concede, however, that “the State’s proof could perhaps be
regarded as more certain if it had convinced all 12 jurors instead of only
nine.”170 However, it has not been determined what majority would no
longer be constitutionally sufficient. Apodaca held that a nine-to-three
conviction was constitutionally permissible, but would a seven-to-five
verdict be considered adequate? In his Johnson concurrence, Justice
Blackmun, for one, stated that if a state employed a seven-to-five standard it
“would afford [him] great difficulty,” but that he found nine votes to be a
“substantial majority.”171
Indeed, proponents of majority verdicts usually cite efficiency as their
main concern, and majority verdicts would certainly increase the efficiency
of jury deliberations.172 However, even the supporters of majority verdicts
acknowledge that reasonable-doubt concerns increase as the majority’s size
decreases. “Part of [the] price” of greater efficiency in the courts “would be
a weakening of the reasonable doubt standard.”173 The debate between
majority and unanimous verdicts is even portrayed as a trade-off between
the accuracy of the verdict and the efficiency of the deliberations: “[w]ith
unanimity, however, the reasonable doubt standard would be satisfied,
although the inefficiency factor would then have its strongest effect.”174
Indeed, the Oregon and Louisiana legislatures acknowledged this trade-off;
when the charge is first-degree murder, both states require unanimity.175
The only conceivable reason why the legislatures would have done so
would be so that those verdicts have greater certainty.176 In all lesser
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crimes, the states have decided, as the Oregon Supreme Court put it, “to
make it easier to obtain convictions.”177 While arguments as to the relative
benefits in the accuracy of the verdict versus the efficiency of the
proceeding and number of convictions are well and good in an academic
discourse, they have no part in the American courts, the overriding goal of
which should be to ensure the innocent are not wrongfully convicted.
Like the unanimity requirement, the reasonable-doubt standard is not
expressly provided for in the language of the Sixth Amendment. But it had
for so long been assumed at common law that this was the required standard
that the Court had no trouble holding that it was constitutionally required
for both federal and state courts. Problematically, majority verdicts do in
fact lessen the burden of proof. Justice Blackmun and indeed the Oregon
and Louisiana legislatures effectively conceded this point, for otherwise
there would be no reason to require a greater number of votes for the most
serious crimes.
C. THE APODACA COURT WAS INCORRECT IN ASSUMING MAJORITY
VERDICTS DO NOT AFFECT THE FUNCTION OF THE JURY

The plurality in Apodaca held unanimity was not constitutionally
required under the assumption that a jury instructed to come to a majority
verdict would function the same as one instructed to come to a unanimous
verdict; any difference in the deliberations would be slight enough not to
raise any doubts about due process.178 The Justices who came to this
conclusion, however, relied on nothing more than their own assumptions,
experiences as judges, and one empirical study, for the proposition that
majority verdicts will result in fewer hung juries.179 Nevertheless, the
plurality assumed that non-unanimous jury deliberations would be “as
robust, and that minority viewpoints would be as thoroughly represented, as
in deliberations by” unanimous juries.180 While those opinions may have
been valid based on the information from which the Justices drew, there
have since been countless jury behavior studies that tell quite a different
story.
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1. Majority Verdicts and Robust Deliberations
The most obvious disadvantage, functionally, of a majority-verdict
jury is that the jurors are “quite conscious” that a majority vote will
suffice.181 This fact was anticipated by Justice Douglas in Johnson, who
felt that majority verdicts, “eliminate[] the circumstances in which a
minority of jurors (a) could have rationally persuaded the entire jury to
acquit, or (b) while unable to persuade the majority to acquit, nonetheless
could have convinced them to convict only on a lesser-included offense.”182
In a study by Professor Shari Diamond of actual Arizona civil juries (in
which only six of eight jurors must agree), some of the juries did attempt to
persuade jurors initially in the minority, even when those votes were not
necessary to return a verdict.183 In other cases, the majority, knowing that
the vote would be sufficient for a verdict, “terminated any attempt to
resolve differences, and ended the debate when the required minimum vote
was reached.”184
Even more telling are data from the Appellate Division of the Oregon
Office of Public Defense Services. The Division analyzed felony jury trial
records for 46.5% of all felony jury trials in Oregon between 2007 and
2008; the juries were polled in 63% of those trials, and in 65.5% of trials in
which the final vote was known, the jury reached a non-unanimous verdict
on at least one of the counts.185 This means that in nearly two thirds of all
the trials in which the final vote was known, at least one of the jurors
dissented on at least one of the counts.186 Proponents of majority votes
frequently frame their argument around the notion that they are trying to
prevent the occasional irrational or obstinate juror from hijacking the
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deliberations.187 However, the results from Oregon—which reveal that
majority verdicts are common, perhaps occurring even in a majority of all
felony trials—cast doubt on that argument.
Robust deliberations are necessary for more important reasons than
that all jurors feel as though they had a say in the final verdict. They
provide an opportunity for jurors “to persuade their fellow jurors to change
course”; but this need not be the complete turnaround of Twelve Angry Men
to be important to the deliberations.188 Deliberation “allows dissenters to
point out nuances that might lead to a consensus that not all charges have
been proved, or that a lesser included charge is more appropriate, after a
more thoughtful and through consideration of the evidence.”189 Otherwise,
in a majority-verdict system, the reaction to minority viewpoints can be as
harsh as one found in Professor Diamond’s study, wherein one juror
informed another, “All right, no offense, but we are going to ignore you.”190
Majority-verdict deliberations tend to be more verdict-driven, meaning that
the jurors are more likely to take the first ballot during the first ten minutes
of deliberation and to vote frequently until they reach a verdict.191
Unanimous-verdict juries, on the other hand, tend to be more evidencedriven, generally delaying their first votes until the evidence has been
discussed.192 As will be discussed shortly, this tendency can have an effect
on the participation (or lack thereof) of women jurors.193
2. Majority Verdicts and Group Representation
From a functional standpoint, juries are supposed to be drawn from a
representative cross section of the community.194 The Court has rejected
both gender- and race-based attempts to exclude jurors;195 members of all
groups have a right to be part of the judicial system. Justice Brennan, in his
dissent in Johnson, addressed this issue: “In my opinion, the right of all
187

Diamond, Rose & Murphy, supra note 183, at 204.
Brief of Jeffrey Abramson et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note
180, at 11.
189
Id.
190
Diamond, Rose & Murphy, supra note 183, at 216.
191
Id. at 208 (citing REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 165 (1983)).
192
Id.
193
Taylor-Thompson, supra note 13, at 1300.
194
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 537 (1975).
195
See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 140–41 (1994) (forbidding genderbased exclusions from the jury); see also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85–86 (1986)
(forbidding race-based exclusions).
188

1430

KATE RIORDAN

[Vol. 101

groups in this Nation to participate in the criminal process means the right
to have their voices heard.”196 Majority verdicts threaten this principle
because, “[w]hen verdicts must be unanimous, no member of the jury may
be ignored by the others. When less than unanimity is sufficient,
consideration of minority views becomes nothing more than a matter of
majority grace.”197 While this is true of all jurors, majority verdicts may
disproportionately exclude the views of women and minorities.
Studies have found that men and women remember evidence and
testimony differently, and in particular, men tend to neglect conduct in the
context of relationships and conceptualize moral issues in a rightsoriented—and consequently more abstract—manner.198 Without adequate
discussion, therefore, different perspectives and evaluations of the evidence
may be missed by the group as a whole. Furthermore, in mock-jury studies,
it has been observed that women speak less frequently during
deliberations.199 When women do offer their opinions, men tend to
interrupt them or ignore their comments.200 In general, women also “take
longer than men to enter” into the discussion.201 The combination of these
factors implies that when a verdict can be returned on a majority vote,
where deliberations are shorter and more result-oriented, the viewpoints of
women are more likely to be disregarded. When unanimity is required, the
viewpoints of all jurors—including women—demand a more thorough
examination.202 It does little good attempting to ensure that juries are fully
representative if the decisionmaking scheme tends to de facto exclude the
viewpoints of women.
There is even more evidence suggesting that jury deliberations benefit
from the viewpoint of racial minorities.203 Unconscious stereotyping, which
can automatically occur even by individuals who do not espouse any racist
notions, will affect how an individual processes information and evidence
shown at trial; and “jurors belonging to the stereotyped group will recall
information differently.”204 Diverse juries will deliberate longer and
196
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consider a wider range of information, and white jurors make fewer
inaccurate statements when in a diverse group than when they are in a
homogenous group.205
The most problematic findings are those that show how ethnicity
changes perceptions of credibility and guilt. Studies by Bodenhausen and
Lichtenstein show that subjects who knew the accused’s ethnicity were
more likely to find him guilty than those who had no such knowledge.206 In
fact, those who knew the defendant’s ethnicity “recommended on average a
sentence twice as long” as those who made the recommendation ignorant of
the defendant’s ethnicity.207
One study examining the results from empirical data compiled on the
effect of race on jury behavior found, simply, “anti-Black bias exerted an
overall significant effect on the sentencing decisions of mock jurors.”208
The presence of jurors who are of a different race from the accused
increases the likelihood that conscious and unconscious biases influence
whether or not the accused will be found guilty.209 Under a majority-verdict
system, any power of minority jurors to bring to the attention of their fellow
jurors information or evidence they may have missed, or to challenge their
fellow jurors to consider a viewpoint that challenges stereotypes and
assumptions, is lost.210
Importantly, the jury serves a critical symbolic role in the judicial
system. Researchers have found in several different studies that jurors who
were required to arrive at a unanimous vote reported greater satisfaction
from their deliberations and had more confidence in their verdicts.211 Those
jurors “also rated their deliberations as more serious and thorough.”212
Interestingly, both the holdouts and the prevailing members of majorityverdict juries rated the deliberations as less thorough and their fellow jurors
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as less open-minded than did those jurors on unanimous juries, implying
that the loss of quality in the deliberations does not only negatively affect
the “loser” voters.213
3. Concerns About Hung Juries Are Overblown
Furthermore, the notion that the number of hung juries would
significantly decrease if majority verdicts were accepted is misguided. It is
true that hung juries in criminal cases are more likely in jurisdictions where
unanimity is required.214 However, hung-jury rates are only on average
around 6.2% of criminal trials; if a ten-to-two vote sufficed for a verdict,
the rate would only be reduced to 3.6%.215 The National Center for State
Courts study of felony juries found that in those cases in which the minority
at the beginning of deliberations consisted of one or two jurors, only 2.9%
ended in a hung jury.216 In 83% of the trials that end in a hung jury, the
minority position was supported by at least three jurors at the beginning of
deliberations.217
“Jury deadlocks predominantly reflect genuine
disagreement over the weight of the evidence, rather than the irrationality or
stubbornness of one or two unreasonable jurors.”218 There is even evidence
that, where the judge was polled as to what he or she would have ruled had
the trial been a bench trial, a substantial number of judges came to the same
conclusion as the holdout jurors.219 This finding “suggests that the conflict
on some of these juries posed precisely the kind of challenge to the majority
position that a deliberative process should welcome.”220
As the majority in Apodaca based the bulk of its analysis on the effect
of unanimity on the function of the jury, it is clear that the holding has been
dramatically undermined by subsequent empirical research. Indeed, far
from confirming the Justices’ assumptions that a jury would behave no
differently in a majority-verdict rather than a unanimous-verdict trial, it has
213

Id. at 225.
KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 179.
215
Diamond, Rose & Murphy, supra note 183, at 207–08.
216
Brief of Jeffrey Abramson et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note
180, at 13 (citing PAULA HANNAFORD-AGOR ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, ARE
HUNG JURIES A PROBLEM? 66 tbl.5.2 (2002), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/
Publications/Res_Juries_HungJuriesProblemPub.pdf).
217
Id.
218
Brief of Jeffrey Abramson et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note
180, at 13.
219
Diamond, Rose & Murphy, supra note 183, at 222.
220
Id.
214

2012]

TEN ANGRY MEN

1433

since been shown that majority-verdict juries have faster, less robust
deliberations and are likely to discount the opinions of women and
minorities. Furthermore, the concerns about the increase in hung juries are
overblown. If a decision of the Supreme Court rests upon assumptions that
turn out to be false, the decision must necessarily be reexamined in light of
newer, more accurate research.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court’s stance against a two-tiered system of incorporation in
McDonald compels a reexamination of those rights that have as yet not
been incorporated to the states, and overturning Apodaca should be one of
the priorities of the Court in the coming terms. Jury unanimity is clearly
fundamental to the Anglo-American system of justice. Unanimous juries
were required in the fourteenth century, and unanimity was since enshrined
in common law as one of the irrefutable rights of an Englishman.
Unanimity in verdicts protects the defendant from the power of the
government, ensures the state is held to a very high standard of proof, and
helps to build the community’s confidence in the judicial system. The
assumption in Apodaca that juries behave the same regardless of the
number of votes required for a verdict has been proven dead wrong. It has
been shown, time and again, that jury deliberations under a majority-vote
scheme are inferior to those under a unanimous scheme: unanimous-verdict
juries are lengthier, more thorough, take into account more viewpoints, and
protect the participation of women and minorities.
The policy reasons are striking, and that is because fundamental
fairness requires that a defendant be subject to the same criminal process
regardless of whether the claim is brought in federal or state court. If Mr.
Apodaca, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Bowen, or Mr. Herrera were tried in another
jurisdiction, it is very possible that they would have been acquitted. But
because—relying on nothing more than intuition—unanimity was deemed
not an ‘essential’ right to be incorporated, the men were convicted.
McDonald requires otherwise; the Court’s stance on the incorporation of all
those rights that are fundamental to the American system compels a
reexamination, and rejection, of the holding in Apodaca.
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